Sokoto’s failing security

The irony of Sokoto State, historically revered as the seat of the Caliphate and a symbol of religious and cultural heritage, is both tragic and profound. Once regarded as a bastion of peace and religious authority, the state has increasingly become a theatre of violence perpetrated by criminals, bandits and jihadist groups. The scale of the devastation is alarming, with more than 50 villages reportedly deserted and about 185 people killed between July and September 2026. More than 850 others have reportedly been injured in attacks that have shattered families and communities. Beyond the loss of lives, ransom payments running into millions of naira have further impoverished already vulnerable populations, while the psychological scars continue to deepen.

The groups driving insecurity in Sokoto are not homogeneous. They include conventional criminal gangs involved in kidnapping for ransom, cattle rustling and extortion; the Lakurawa group, which reportedly seeks to radicalise communities and impose its interpretation of Islamic law; and the Islamic State Sahel Province, known for attacks on military and security personnel. Another threat comes from Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), an al-Qaeda affiliate active across the Sahel. In addition, hybrid networks are emerging, combining criminal operations with extremist activities. This convergence makes the security challenge more complex, as economic exploitation and ideological violence increasingly overlap.

Banditry has plagued neighbouring Zamfara and Katsina states for nearly a decade, while Sokoto had remained relatively insulated from the worst of the violence. That fragile peace began to unravel as Lakurawa reportedly established a foothold in neighbouring Kebbi State and infiltrated parts of Sokoto. The development exposes the shortcomings of a fragmented security approach across the North-West. A coordinated strategy involving intelligence sharing, joint operations and cross-border cooperation could have helped identify and contain threats before they spread. The failure to anticipate and deter the expansion of criminal and extremist networks has left communities increasingly vulnerable.

Sokoto’s geographical position further compounds the challenge. Its long border with Niger Republic and its connections to other Sahelian countries create opportunities for the movement of arms and militant groups. The illegal arms trade, reportedly intensified by the aftermath of the Libyan conflict, has contributed to the proliferation of weapons across the region. These weapons, often transported through poorly monitored border routes, have strengthened the capacity of bandits and extremist groups to carry out deadly attacks.

Successive governments should have treated border security, intelligence coordination and surveillance as urgent national priorities. Although the length and complexity of Nigeria’s borders present genuine difficulties, they cannot become a permanent excuse for inaction. The Nigeria Immigration Service and the Nigeria Customs Service, working with the police, military and local communities, must develop a more effective system for monitoring border crossings and disrupting the movement of arms and fighters. This requires better coordination, accountability and the use of intelligence-led surveillance.

A layered security arrangement would enable agencies to share intelligence, coordinate patrols and engage communities in reporting suspicious movements. Such an approach would strengthen the country’s ability to respond to threats before they develop into large-scale attacks. Border security, however, must be part of a broader strategy that addresses the conditions enabling criminal groups to operate with relative impunity.

Another important measure is the strengthening of community-based security structures across the North-West. Local vigilantes are often the first to respond when rural communities come under attack, but many lack adequate equipment and support. Expecting them to confront heavily armed bandits with inferior weapons exposes them to grave risks. The authorities should assess their operational needs, provide appropriate equipment and training, and establish clear systems of supervision and accountability.

Zamfara’s Community Protection Guard, Katsina’s Community Watch and Sokoto’s Community Guard provide examples of state-level initiatives. However, these structures should not operate in isolation. Where legally and operationally appropriate, they should be integrated into a coordinated regional security framework, working under the supervision of established security agencies. Any provision of firearms must be subject to lawful authorisation, proper training, strict controls and accountability to prevent abuse and diversion of weapons.

The North-West also needs a common security network capable of coordinating intelligence and operations across state boundaries. Criminal groups do not respect administrative borders, and security responses should reflect this reality. While community-based security arrangements may help improve local protection, they cannot replace the responsibilities of the police, military and other authorised security institutions. Their effectiveness will depend on proper coordination, oversight and sustained government support.

Ultimately, confronting insecurity in Sokoto and across Nigeria requires political will, institutional accountability and a sustained commitment to protecting citizens. Allegations of collusion between political actors, security personnel, traditional rulers and criminal groups must be investigated transparently, and anyone found culpable should face the law. Governments must also learn from the failure of peace agreements, ransom payments and inconsistent security interventions to deliver lasting stability.

The flow of weapons from Libya and other sources is an important dimension of the crisis, but external factors alone do not explain the persistence of insecurity. Weak enforcement, poor coordination and failures of governance also contribute to the problem. The responsibility for protecting Nigeria’s sovereignty and securing its people rests with the government at all levels.

Sokoto’s plight demands urgent attention, not merely as a security emergency but as a threat to the region’s social fabric, economy and cultural heritage. Communities should not be forced to abandon their homes, livelihoods and ancestral lands because the state cannot guarantee their safety. The authorities must move beyond reactive measures and adopt a coordinated, accountable and sustained strategy to restore peace. Nigerians deserve to live without fear, and Sokoto’s historical significance makes its security a matter of national concern.